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1 
U.S. V. WARREN, OH: THE CASE FOR APPLYING 
ARISTOTELIAN MODELING IN POLICE REFORM 
Alicia McCaffrey  
 
Abstract: 
Police reform scholarship tends to emphasize the bureaucratic nature of 
problems in policing, and, in turn, proposes administrative solutions, 
such as providing more training or critiquing specific language in a 
manual. This comment argues that instead of viewing policing problems 
as at their core administrative, we should be willing to view them, at 
least in part, as moral failings warranting ethical solutions. This per-
spective allows research on police reform to draw from a much larger 
corpus of existing ethical writings. This paper applies ethical theory to 
police reform in the specific context of U.S. v. Warren, arguing that the 
success of the reforms implemented in the Warren Police Department is 
due in large part to the department's use of Aristotle's theory of “ethical 
modeling”: ethics is best taught by providing people with moral models 
whose behavior they can emulate. Other police departments can apply 
Aristotelian ethical theory by providing positive models from which of-
ficers can learn proper policing practices. This can be accomplished in 
several ways, such as expanding the use of mentoring programs, using 
more hypothetical role-playing in training, and publicizing stories of of-
ficers who properly de-escalated tense situations. 
 Introduction 
Under the authority provided by 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) can file a lawsuit against a local police department for a 
“pattern or practice of conduct . . . that deprives persons of rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.”1 The DOJ filed a claim against the Warren Police 
Department (WPD) in 2012 using this statute.2 While the Technical As-
sistance Letter that the DOJ issued as a result of its investigation was 
largely ineffective in facilitating reform, the Settlement Agreement 
which the lawsuit produced led to several reforms in the following years, 
most of which are largely regarded as successful.3 This paper examines 
                                                   
1. 42 U.S.C. 14141, (2012). 
2. Complaint, U.S. v. City of Warren, No. 4:12-cv-00086 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2012), ECF No. 1, 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-OH-0004-0004.pdf. 
3. See Letter from Jonas Geissler, Senior Trial Att’y, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Greg Hicks, Law Dir., City of Warren, Ohio app. (Dec. 18, 2013), 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-OH-0004-0006.pdf [hereinafter 2013 Compliance 
Letter] (listing the reforms taken); Telephone Interview with Eric Merkel, Chief of Police, Warren 
Police Dep’t (Apr. 12, 2016). 
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U.S. v. Warren to identify why the Settlement Agreement reforms in 
Warren were so successful and how those factors can be used in the fu-
ture to create meaningful reform in other police departments.  
 
I argue that the predominant factor that led to success in Warren was 
the implementation of the Aristotelian idea that people learn ethical be-
havior by watching role models; the WPD implemented this idea by 
providing positive models of constitutional policing for officers to emu-
late. This modeling took several forms, such as the examples set by the 
leaders in the police department and the use of a mentorship program to 
train officers. This paper examines the Aristotelian principles in context. 
Part I focuses on the specific situation in Warren, Ohio, including the in-
cidents that led to the investigation, the provisions of the Technical As-
sistance Letter and the Settlement Agreement, and the current state of 
compliance. Part II situates the practical discussion of the use of positive 
models within a wider ethical framework, arguing that one should view 
police reform at least in part as an ethical issue and thus should draw 
from ethical concepts when considering how to successfully implement 
police reform. Part III concludes by examining how the use of positive 
models can be used in other police reforms going forward.  
I. The Case of U.S. v. Warren 
A. Incidents Leading to Reform 
The DOJ first began an investigation of police misconduct in War-
ren in 2003. Multiple incidents triggered the investigation, many of 
which were allegations of excessive force. Two incidents gained traction 
in the media. First, in March 2003, a bystander shot a video of WPD of-
ficers arrested two teenage sisters (ages 16 and 17).4 The tape showed 
one officer slamming one girl on the hood of the car with such force that 
the hood dented.5 Another officer hit the other sister on her side with his 
baton after she was handcuffed.6 The second incident caused significant-
ly more public backlash, though. In June 2003, a neighbor videotaped an 
                                                   
4. Telephone Interview with Jack Morse, Trial Att’y, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Apr. 15, 2016).  
5. Id. 
6. Telephone Interview with Jack Morse, Trial Att’y, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Apr. 15, 2016).  
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incident involving police officers beating Lyndal Kimble in the presence 
of his wife and child.7 Officers had originally pulled Kimble over be-
cause he failed to use his turn signal.8 When police suspected that Kim-
ble had hidden a bag of crack cocaine in his mouth they began beating 
him, also using a chemical spray to subdue him.9 A neighbor witnessing 
the incident called 911, saying, “I need an ambulance. We have cops 
beating the hell out of a black guy. This is not called for. This is bad.”10 
The story, including the video, made national news.11 
 
In addition to these use of force issues, there were also instances of 
unconstitutional searches. In 2003 there was an internal investigation of 
the strip search of Dominic Gambone, which revealed that some officers 
had been conducting strip searches and body cavity searches on male 
suspects even for minor crimes.12 Gambone received a $75,000 settle-
ment.13 Officers were also conducting searches that were against de-
partment policy, including searching suspects without the prior approval 
of a supervisor and without filing the necessary paperwork afterward.14 
 
These issues caused community organizations to raise concerns that 
WPD practices were unconstitutional. Multiple local organizations, par-
ticularly those involved in the African-American community, including 
the NAACP, the Trumbull County Interdenominational Ministerial Alli-
ance, and the Greater Warren-Youngstown Urban League, expressed 
concerns that the relationship between the WPD and the local communi-
ty was one of distrust.15 The Urban League made the complaint to the 
DOJ that prompted the investigation. 16 
 
                                                   
7. Richard Olivito, Lyndal Kimble “I Can't Breathe” Warren Oh White Police Beating June 03, 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IlruaNxZpU8; see Telephone Inter-
view with Jack Morse, supra note 6; Telephone Interview with Traci Sabau, Assistant Law 
Dir./Police Legal Advisor, Warren Police Dep’t (Apr. 12, 2016).  
8. John Caniglia, Warren’s Work with Justice Department Involving Excessive Force by Officers 
Offers Road Map for Cleveland, CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 4, 2014, 11:33 AM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2014/12/warrens_work_with_justice_depa.html. 
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
11. See Did Cops in Taped Arrest Get Too Rough?, ABC NEWS (July 3, 2003), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=125003&page=1. 
12. Assoc. Press, Warren Police Chief Reopens Strip Searches Investigation, CLEVELAND 19 NEWS 
(2005), http://www.cleveland19.com/story/3215447/warren-police-chief-reopens-strip-searches-inv
estigation 
13. Id. 
14. Telephone Interview with Traci Sabau, supra note 7.  
15. Id.  
16. Telephone Interview with Jack Morse, supra note 6.  
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While information about how the DOJ makes decisions about which 
cases to become involved in is confidential, in general the Assistant At-
torney General or Deputy Attorneys General would review several justi-
fication memos regarding local organizations’ requests for action.17 The 
Assistant Attorney General or the Deputy Attorneys General would then 
decide not to proceed with several of them.18 During the course of the 
Bush administration, the DOJ opened investigations in only twenty-one 
§ 14141 allegations.19 Warren was likely chosen for two reasons: first 
because there was a sense that there were significant problems at the 
time in the police departments in various cities in the Rust Belt Region 
(investigations into the Cleveland and Chicago Police Departments were 
also opened around the same time), and second because of the media at-
tention.20 The DOJ began their investigation of the WPD in 2004.21 
 
During its investigation, the DOJ discovered that the WPD also had 
a severely dysfunctional complaint system. Formally, there were two 
complaint systems: the Complaint Form for serious allegations and the 
Minor Incident Resolution Form for less serious allegations.22 The for-
mal Complaint Form was used for both external and internal investiga-
tions.23 The Minor Incident Resolution Form, however, was for all in-
formal complaints that could be resolved without a full investigation, 
usually when the complaint alleged what the department considered “in-
significant police violations.”24 The DOJ investigation found that the use 
of the informal system allowed for “inappropriate handling and resolu-
tion of allegations of constitutional violations,” 25 and, because of the 
lack of thorough investigation, often resulted in the WPD lacking critical 
information about potential officer misconduct that might expose the de-
partment to liability.26 The language on the complaint form also discour-
aged people from filing complaints by warning them of potential liabil-
                                                   
17. Id. 
18. Telephone Interview with Jonas Geissler, Senior Trial Att’y, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice (May 3, 2016).  
19. See Simone Weichselbaum, Policing the Police: As the Justice Department Pushes Reform, 
Some Changes Don’t Last, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 26, 2015, 6:12 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/23/policing-the-police#.HTHFiErpi. 
20. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Smith, Chief, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Apr. 13, 2016). 
21. Telephone Interview with Jack Morse, supra note 6.  
22. Letter from Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Michael  
O'Brien, Mayor, City of Warren, Ohio 9 (Mar. 2, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/c
rt/legacy/2010/12/15/wpd_talet_3-2-06.pdf [hereinafter Technical Assistance Letter].  
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 9–13. 
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ity,27 the problems of which were compounded by separate issues re-
garding how the complaint system was presented to potential complain-
ants. The public generally knew that Police Chief John Mandopoulous 
would tell citizens who attempted to lodge a complaint to leave the 
building.28 
B. Technical Assistance Letter 
In 2006 the DOJ issued a Technical Assistance Letter to the WPD.29 
The letter emphasized several areas in need of improvement. First, the 
policies regarding the use of force needed to be changed.30 Specifically, 
there needed to be a policy stating that officers could draw their firearms 
only when an incident created a “reasonable belief that it may be neces-
sary to use the firearm.”31 The Technical Assistance Letter also recom-
mended the use of a deadly force review board that would report to and 
advise the police chief regarding the need for use of force training.32 
 
Second, in addition to use of force, the Technical Assistance Letter 
also addressed how officers conducted searches and implemented the 
complaint process. The DOJ determined that officers needed more train-
ing to adhere to the current policy regarding strip searches and body cav-
ity searches.33 With regard to the complaint process, many aspects of 
WPD’s complaint policy that were determined to be satisfactory still 
needed to be effectively implemented.34 The DOJ also suggested that the 
WPD streamline their current complaint system (which contained both 
the formal and informal complaint processes) to one formal process that 
would be more accessible to the public.35 To accomplish this, the DOJ 
suggested for them to remove language on the complaint form that 
warned complainants that they could be subject to civil or criminal 
charges if they knowingly filed an untrue complaint,36 to accept anony-
                                                   
27. See id. at 11 (saying the complaint language “may inappropriately discourage the filing of com-
plaints”). 
28. Telephone Interview with Eric Merkel, supra note 3. 
29. Technical Assistance Letter, supra note 25. 
30. Technical Assistance Letter, supra note 25, at 3–4. 
31. Id. at 5. 
32. Id. at 6–7. 
33. Id. at 7–8. 
34. For example, the policy of allowing citizens to file complaint forms with any officer was not 
adhered to in practice. Id. at 10. 
35. Id. at 9. 
36. Id. at 11–12. 
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mous and third party complaints,37 and to keep a “yearbook” available 
for complainants so that they could attempt to identify the officer or of-
ficers who were the subject of the complaint.38 Finally, the DOJ recom-
mended that Internal Affairs be willing to investigate additional miscon-
duct discovered in the process of investigating a particular complaint, to 
proceed in a more timely manner, and to not provide officers with op-
portunities to corroborate each others’ written statements.39 
 
Third, the Technical Assistance Letter suggested for the WPD to in-
troduce mechanisms to facilitate accountability. The DOJ recommended 
that the command staff and supervisors periodically review uses of 
force, probable causes for arrests, appropriateness of filed charges, and 
the reasonableness of the suspicion for searches.40 Furthermore, the DOJ 
recommended that the WPD institute an Early Warning System in order 
to identify officers with repeated violations of excessive force and re-
spond appropriately before a major incident occurred.41 Finally, in addi-
tion to all of the above suggestions, the Technical Assistance Letter em-
phasized the general need for more training to implement current policy 
and forthcoming policy changes. Specifically, the DOJ recommended 
that the WPD require that officers receive forty hours of in-service train-
ing each year.42 
 
The recommendations in the Technical Assistance Letter led to some 
improvement in the following years, but generally went unheeded and 
did not result in the substantial reforms which the DOJ anticipated. 
While there was a decrease in the number of public complaints regarding 
use of force, other recommendations had yet to be implemented.43 There 
had been other highly publicized incidents of excessive force, including 
a controversial videotaped incident in 2007 where an officer tased Heidi 
Gill.44 There, Gill had come out of a tavern and was combative with of-
ficers.45 In response, an officer tased her several times.46 The officer’s 
                                                   
37. Id. at 13. 
38. Id. at 14. 
39. Id. at 20. 
40. Id. at 23. 
41. Id. at 24–25. 
42. Id. at 27. 
43. Telephone Interview with Jonas Geissler, supra note 18. 
44. BadCase, Woman Tasered By Warren Ohio Police Officer, YOUTUBE (Sept. 24, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vFH9kmKZX_o; see also Telephone Interview with Eric Mer-
kel, supra note 3. 
45. Wayne Drash, Woman Says She Didn't Deserve Taser Treatment, CNN (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/tasered.woman/. 
46. Patty Coller, Woman at Center of Warren Police Brutality Case Dies, WKBN FIRST NEWS 27 
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tasing was caught on video, which then received national attention and 
prompted public outrage.47 While the officer was eventually reinstated, 
Gill was awarded over $300,000 in a settlement.48 Seeing the need for 
further reform, the DOJ opted to implement a Settlement Agreement in 
2012.49 The decision to create an enforceable Settlement Agreement six 
years after the Technical Assistance Letter was the result of fairly regu-
lar reviews of the docket in an effort to resolve cases. While the review 
was simply a periodic review, rather than a direct result of the change in 
administration,50 the decision to opt for a more enforceable agreement 
was a result of a change of approach to Section 14141 litigation. The 
Bush administration had relied heavily on generalized Technical Assis-
tance Letters. The Obama administration shifted its focus on particular-
ized issues and preferred to use more enforceable agreements to imple-
ment specific reforms.51 
C. Settlement Agreement 
The provisions of the Settlement Agreement were substantively very 
similar to those of the Technical Assistance Letter. The Settlement 
Agreement set out concrete recommendations to improve use of force 
policy, practice, and evaluation. For example, the DOJ mandated that the 
WPD provide a matrix regarding what level of force is appropriate in re-
sponse to specific actions,52 equip officers with an intermediate weap-
on,53 document uses of force in writing,54 immediately inform supervi-
                                                   
(Apr. 8, 2016, 5:35 AM), http://wkbn.com/2016/04/07/woman-at-center-of-warren-police-brutality-
case-dies/. 
47. See, e.g., Drash, supra note 45; Tasered Ohio Woman Describes Agony, CBS News (Sept. 25, 
2007, 8:41 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tasered-ohio-woman-describes-agony/. 
48. Coller, supra note 46. 
49. Settlement Agreement, U.S. v. City of Warren, No. 4:12-cv-00086 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2012), 
ECF No. 4, https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-OH-0004-0003.pdf. 
50. Telephone Interview with Jonas Geissler, supra note 18 (“It wasn’t a political determination. It 
was driven by the facts.”); Telephone Interview with Tim Mygatt, Special Counsel, Special Litig. 
Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 3, 2016) (“In general, we had been working on trying to evalu-
ate the docket and we do that regularly. I can only speak as to when I became a manager in 2011. 
Jonathan [Smith] and I were going through the docket to look at the older cases just as a regular 
review. We don’t want the docket to stay idle generally. We had a number of old cases that weren’t 
being resolved.”). 
51. Telephone Interview with Tim Mygatt, supra note 50. 
52. Settlement Agreement, supra note 49, at 18; Telephone Interview with Tim Mygatt, Special 
Counsel, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 3, 2016) (stating that the decision to 
implement an enforceable settlement agreement rather than to proceed with only the unenforceable 
technical assistance letter was “a difference in the way we started enforcing during the time peri-
od”). 
53. Id. at 5. 
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sors of uses of force,55 and prohibit officers from corroborating with 
each other on their written statements.56 As for the complaint process, 
the DOJ ordered that the WPD accept complaints in several different 
forms,57 adhere to specific investigation timelines,58 and train the internal 
affairs department to conduct more thorough investigations.59 The Set-
tlement Agreement also set out specific curriculum requirements for of-
ficer training.60 Additionally, the DOJ mandated the use of an Early 
Warning System to facilitate officer discipline or extra training at an ear-
lier stage of misconduct.61 Finally, the agreement created accountability 
for the police department by implementing regular monitoring by the 
DOJ.62 
 
While it is difficult to categorize reforms into a simple dichotomy of 
“successful” or “unsuccessful,” the Settlement Agreement reforms in the 
WPD have had a fairly positive effect. There are quantitative measures 
of success that can demonstrate that the WPD has come into compliance 
with the Settlement Agreement rather quickly: by 2013, the WPD had 
substantially complied with seventeen provisions, partially complied 
with eighteen provisions, and had not complied with eleven provisions.63 
According to the latest Compliance Letter from January 2015, the WPD 
was in partial compliance with eighteen of the forty-seven Settlement 
Agreement provisions, as well as in substantial compliance with the oth-
er twenty-nine provisions.64 Current Police Chief Eric Merkel indicated 
that they “were told by the DOJ that we were set to come into compli-
ance [with the Settlement Agreement] quicker than any department in 
the nation.”65 
 
In addition to these more quantitative measures of success presented 
in the compliance letters and charts, there are also more qualitative 
measures which can demonstrate that reforms have dramatically im-
                                                   
54. Id. at 7. 
55. Id. at 8. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 9–10. 
58. Id. at 10. 
59. See id. at 11. 
60. Id. at 19–20. 
61. Id. at 13 (calling the system an “early intervention system”). 
62. Id. at 20–21. 
63. 2013 Compliance Letter, supra note 3. 
64. Letter from Jack Morse, Trial Att’y, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Greg Hicks,  
Law Dir., City of Warren, Ohio 2 (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN
-OH-0004-0007.pdf. 
65. Telephone Interview with Eric Merkel, supra note 3. 
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proved community relations. Traci Sabau, formerly an Assistant City 
Prosecutor who now works in the WPD to ensure its compliance, re-
counted a recent incident in which there was an officer shooting.66 With-
in two days of this shooting, the police department held an open forum 
for all of the interested community organizations.67 The WPD explained 
what it knew at that point regarding the circumstances of the shooting 
and reaffirmed its commitment to conduct a thorough investigation.68 
Because of this new community-oriented approach to handling question-
able officer conduct—surely a result of the WPD’s ongoing cooperation 
with the DOJ—there was no backlash.69 In Sabau’s words, “[There is an] 
understanding [in the police department] that being accountable makes it 
easier to do your job if the community isn’t questioning you. They aren’t 
fighting you as much. When you need to shoot someone, they under-
stand.”70 
D. Reasons for Success 
One can speculate as to why the Settlement Agreement was so effec-
tive for the WPD whereas the Technical Assistance Letter, which was 
very similar to the Settlement Agreement, was so ineffective. First, there 
are explicit textual differences between the documents that could help 
explain why this might have resulted. The Settlement Agreement con-
tained more concrete goals;71 clearly defined goals surely facilitated 
changes in the WPD. The Settlement Agreement also contained fewer 
mandates than the Technical Assistance Letter recommended,72 so per-
haps the compliance with the Settlement Agreement is a result of more 
realistic reform goals. Another factor that certainly contributed to why 
the Settlement Agreement was vastly more successful was that it con-
tained provisions to allow for more DOJ monitoring to determine if the 
department remained in noncompliance; the threat of being held in con-
tempt of court if the WPD did not comply also created an incentive to 
                                                   
66. Telephone Interview with Traci Sabau, supra note 7. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id.  
71. For example, the Settlement Agreement mandated specific numbers of training hours and specif-
ic protocol requirements and deadlines for internal investigations. See Settlement Agreement, supra 
note 49 at 9–13. 
72. For example, the suggestions about the Trumbull Housing Authority in the Technical Assistance 
Letter are not present in the Settlement Agreement. Compare Technical Assistance Letter, supra 
note 25, at 8 with Settlement Agreement, supra note 49. 
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effectuate change.73 
 
Second, in addition to these textual differences, another reason for 
success of the reforms can be attributed to the implementation of the Set-
tlement Agreement. The WPD went through a fortunately-timed change 
in leadership as the Settlement Agreement was being implemented.74 
Whereas the past leadership at the time of the Technical Assistance Let-
ter was not receptive to reform, the current WPD leadership recognized 
the need for change in their policies and practices and is thus very coop-
erative with the DOJ.75 Factors as amorphous as leaders’ attitudes and a 
reform-friendly “police culture” are very difficult to measure and per-
haps even more difficult to recreate, especially when the DOJ is con-
fronted with police department leadership that is more prone to react to 
reforms with hostility than with open arms. Still, it only makes sense 
that having leadership which models a willingness to improve current 
policies and practices can be one of the most indispensable means of 
achieving meaningful change within a police department.76 As U.S. At-
torney Steve Dettelbach said, 
The most important things are cultural. You want to have a cul-
ture of responsibility and accountability in the police depart-
ment, just like any business—a culture of compliance, and that 
starts at the top. The tone at the top, the leadership is very im-
portant in these kinds of situation[s]. And when you have good 
leadership and good tone it makes everything else easier. . . . If 
you have a culture of turning [all complaints] away, you’ll never 
be able to diagnose problems before they get too big. You can 
have a great complaint procedure and safeguards for accounta-
bility but if you don’t have that culture it will fail.77 
Officers at all levels, and particularly those in leadership roles, can 
model for more resistant officers a more cooperative and enthusiastic 
approach to implementing reforms for more resistant officers. 
                                                   
73. Settlement Agreement, supra note 49, at 20–23; Interview with Tim Mygatt, supra note 50. 
74. See Ed Runyan, Mandopoulos retiring as Warren police chief, The Vindicator (April 10, 2009, 
12:07 AM), http://www.vindy.com/news/2009/apr/10/mandopoulos-retiring-as-warren-police-chief/ 
(recounting Chief Mandopoulos’ retirement in April 2009). 
75. See Telephone Interview with Jack Morse, Att’y, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Apr. 11, 2016). 
76. See Samuel Walker, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making 
Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 57, 67 (2012) (discussing the importance of 
changing police culture in order to achieve sustainable reforms). 
77. Telephone Interview with Steve Dettelbach, U.S. Att’y, N. Dist. of Ohio (Apr. 15, 2016). 
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In Warren, the opportunity to hire a new police chief created the 
space for a new, more cooperative leadership to bring the department in-
to compliance with the Settlement Agreement. As previously alluded to, 
the former police chief, Chief Mandopoulos, did not welcome citizen 
complaints, nor was he particularly cooperative in implementing the re-
forms that the DOJ encouraged in the Technical Assistance Letter. Cur-
rent police chief Eric Merkel explained, 
There was no leadership and no discipline [when] John Manda-
poulos was the chief. He would literally kick people [who were 
trying to file complaints] out of the building. During this time, 
obviously the African American community didn’t like the po-
lice. And he wasn’t the greatest spokesman for the police de-
partment. He was old school. . . . In [2006, the Department of 
Justice] issued the Technical Assistance Letter, which [Man-
dopoulos] didn’t do much with.78 
In 2009, Mandopoulos agreed to retire and was replaced by Tim 
Bowers, who left shortly after.79 Merkel then replaced Bowers in 2013.80 
By both the DOJ’s and Warren government’s accounts, Chief Merkel, as 
well as the other current command staff and supervisors, is very recep-
tive to the reforms. According to Sabau, “This chief, he’s very profes-
sional and progressive and open to dealing with the community. . . .”81 
Jack Morse shared the same opinion, saying, “[Chief Merkel] is on 
board with reforming the police department in a very effective manner. 
And we’re seeing change come to Warren that is both effective, and 
that’s happening relatively quickly. . . . [T]he progress is to the credit of 
Chief Merkel and command staff who are on board.”82 
 
In addition to replacing the former police chief, the WPD has re-
placed approximately a quarter of its sixty officers in the past three to 
four years.83 Chief Merkel maintains that hiring new officers has also 
helped to encourage compliance because as opposed to having to con-
vince officers who are resistant to the reforms to change their behavior, 
                                                   
78. Telephone Interview with Eric Merkel, supra note 3. 
79. Id. 
80. Eric Merkel is Warren’s new police chief, The Vindicator (June 18, 2013, 6:09 PM) 
http://www.vindy.com/news/2013/jun/18/eric-merkel-is-warren8217s-new-police-ch/ 
81. Telephone Interview with Traci Sabau, supra note 7. 
82. Telephone Interview with Jack Morse, Att’y, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Apr. 
11, 2016). 
83. Telephone Interview with Eric Merkel, supra note 3. 
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“all [the new officers] know is the professional angle of [the DOJ Set-
tlement Agreement].”84 These new officers can be trained properly from 
the beginnings of their careers and are more willing to model enthusiasm 
for community oriented policing within the department. 
 
A third contributing factor to the efficacy of the reforms is the 
WPD’s use of certain mentoring techniques in officer training. Though 
the Settlement Agreement did not explicitly mandate the use of a men-
toring program to train younger officers, the WPD has implemented 
mentoring in both the orientation training of new officers as well as in 
response to concerns about an officer’s uses of force. New officers must 
go through a nine-month field training in which they work a shift with 
three different officers who each provide separate assessments of the 
new officer.85 The department mentors officers who are not as new to the 
department.86 When an officer has had multiple uses of force that seem 
to manifest not ill intent but lack of training, the WPD also pairs the of-
ficer with an officer who has an excellent use of force record. Sabau ex-
plains: 
We go line by line through every single use of force and we do 
the same thing with Internal Affairs complaints. Discipline tends 
to be reserved for issues when it was intentional or [the officer 
had] bad intentions. If it’s mistakes, it’s training. We have a 
young officer where none of the situations were wrong but 
[there was] a pattern of bad tactics. So we put him with one of 
our most proactive and well versed officers to ride with him for 
a while. Show him how you do it, how you avoid getting into 
uses of force, because of different tactics.87 
The WPD has one officer, in particular, who has been with the de-
partment for many years and has a very good record for not using exces-
sive force.88 This officer unofficially specializes in mentoring the newer 
officers.89 
 
Thus, in addition to implementing the concrete proposals in the set-
tlement agreement, the WPD has effectively created a police culture at 
                                                   
84. Id. 
85. Telephone Interview with Traci Sabau, supra note 7. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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every level of the department hierarchy that recognizes the need for re-
forming policies and practices to achieve community-oriented policing, 
by using positive modeling in both police culture (by rehiring) and in 
training (by mentoring programs). This culture was created and is per-
petuated by fortunately timed rehiring and the use of mentoring. 
II. Police Culture and Mentoring as Aristotelian Modeling 
Many articles attempting to isolate the factors that contribute to suc-
cessful, long-lasting police reforms focus on accountability. In these ar-
ticles, authors often focus on particular means by which to achieve ac-
countability, such as through information gathering or community 
involvement.90 Of course, the importance of creating accountability for 
police officers cannot be overstated. The DOJ brings § 14141 claims be-
cause there is a “pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement of-
ficers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured or protected by the Constitution and other laws of the United 
States.”91 Essentially, a police department has behaved poorly yet has 
not independently instituted reforms. It is absolutely necessary to pro-
vide the appropriate discipline and training when officers engage in un-
constitutional behavior, and that can only happen through mechanisms 
of accountability. 
 
The discourse in these accountability-focused articles approaches 
problems in policing as bureaucratic problems that can be solved, at least 
in large part, by creating the proper set of incentives and disincentives. 
This outlook is likely accurate in many ways. Viewing problems in po-
licing as bureaucratic systems of incentives, however, does not fully cap-
ture the depth and multi-faceted nature of police reform. One critique of 
this paradigm is that it overemphasizes the importance of workplace en-
vironment and largely neglects the importance of individual character. 
This is understandable because it is easier to conceptualize changing en-
vironments, and environments surely influence individual behavior. 
However, by focusing on the system of incentives and accountability to 
implement those incentives, we perhaps lose sight of the fact that there 
                                                   
90. See Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police Regulation 
by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 123–34 (2012); Debra Livingston, Police Re-
form and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 842–
56 (1999); Alexandra Holmes, Note, Bridging the Information Gap: The Department of Justice’s 
“Pattern or Practice” Suits and Community Organizations, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1241 (2014). 
91. 42 U.S.C. 14141, (2012); see, e.g., Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 1. 
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are other ways to facilitate reforms. 
 
Another way to view the problem of unconstitutional policing that is 
not so widely advocated for in the literature is as an ethical issue. Exces-
sive force, unreasonable searches, and the police officers’ lack of empa-
thy toward their communities are all moral problems. Whether such 
problems stem from ignorance of the law or from malicious intentions, 
the need for police officers to treat citizens with appropriate levels of re-
spect and compassion is a problem well within the ethical sphere. 
 
Thus, it is not surprising that one can draw from ethical theories 
when attempting to construct methods of reform. The method that was 
employed in Warren—the use of positive modeling—is one that has its 
roots in Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics. Aristotle emphasizes the importance of 
ethical “role models” to demonstrate to students how to be a virtuous 
person: 
Virtue then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellec-
tual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to 
teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), 
while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit . . . . Again, it 
is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue 
is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is 
from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are 
produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders 
and all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of 
building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have 
been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born 
good or bad at their craft.92 
By intellectual virtue, Aristotle means qualities such as “knowledge, 
good judgment, and ‘practical wisdom,’” whereas by moral virtue he 
means qualities such as bravery, honesty, and fairness.93 The distinction 
                                                   
92. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 20–21 (W.D. Ross trans., Batoche Books, 1999) (ebook), 
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/aristotle/Ethics.pdf; see also SIMON 
BLACKBURN, BEING GOOD: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 113 (2d. ed. 2003) (“[Aristotle] 
emphasized that it takes education and practice in order to become virtuous. It does not just happen . 
. . .”); Virtue Ethics, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/ (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2017) (“Moral education and development is a major part of virtue ethics. Moral develop-
ment, at least in its early stages, relies on the availability of good role models. The virtuous agent 
acts as a role model and the student of virtue emulates his or her example.”). 
93. JONATHAN BARNES, ARISTOTLE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 125 (2000) (“Aristotle distin-
guishes between excellences of character and excellences of intellect. The former include both what 
we think of as moral virtue—courage, generosity, fair-mindedness, and so on—and also such dispo-
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is not terribly important, though, in the context of police reform as re-
forms should encourage both kinds of virtue. 
 
This method of teaching virtue differs from other methods in that it 
emphasizes the educational development involved in becoming virtuous. 
Whereas other systems of ethics, such as utilitarianism or Kantianism 
provide bases for virtuous behavior (such choosing an action based on 
what will bring about the most good for the most people, or performing 
your duty, respectively), Aristotelian virtue ethics provides not just one 
formula on which to base moral decisions, but instead provides an edu-
cational method to learn virtue.94 
 
In regard to both intellectual and moral virtue, Aristotle’s view that 
one’s habits create one’s character creates an important role for those 
who exemplify proper behavior and instruct others as to how to behave 
properly. Teachers and role models help us form the habits necessary to 
cultivate both types of virtue. Thus, the importance of role models in the 
early stage of moral development cannot be understated. It is our role 
models who provide us with someone to emulate, and thus facilitate hab-
its that aid in virtue.95 
A. Implementing Aristotle’s Models of Virtue 
There are various ways in which police departments can implement 
Aristotle’s idea of providing positive models of virtue. Some are fairly 
simple and are already quite commonplace. Providing model policies to 
police departments required by settlement agreements to rewrite those 
policies implements positive modeling in a very basic sense. Additional-
ly, as previously mentioned, police departments can use mentoring pro-
grams to show officers practical skills, such as how to de-escalate tense 
situations, when it is appropriate to use certain degrees of force, and 
when it is appropriate to conduct certain kinds of searches. Models can 
also more generally demonstrate attitudes of cooperation and enthusiasm 
for reform. While it can sometimes be difficult to find models for more 
senior members of the force, programs such as the DOJ’s Community 
Oriented Policing Services Office can organize peer exchanges in an ef-
fort for more senior officers to work with other senior officers at differ-
                                                   
sitions as a proper self-respect, an appropriate degree of ostentation, and wit; the latter include such 
things as knowledge, good judgment, ‘practical wisdom.’”). 
94. See BLACKBURN, supra note 92, at 17, 86–93. 
95. See Virtue Ethics, supra note 92. 
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ent departments.96 
 
Another fairly popular way to incorporate modeling is by using hy-
pothetical scenarios in training. This can provide more memorable train-
ing by providing officers with past interaction experiences to rely on in 
the field.97 By allowing officers to act out hypothetical scenarios during 
training, those officers in charge of training can not only provide critical 
feedback but can also draw attention to when an officer responds to an 
incident properly. Using hypothetical scenarios in training also provides 
a more public forum in which several other officers can observe and 
learn from an officer responding well in a hypothetical situation.98 Thus, 
incorporating this kind of modeling in hypothetical training scenarios 
provides an even more efficient use of role models than mentoring does. 
While on-the-job mentoring might allow one officer the opportunity to 
observe a role model, training provides a forum in which several officers 
can observe. 
 
Changing hiring practices to attract officers and police leadership 
who are enthusiastic toward community policing is also an important 
way to provide role models within a police department. The DOJ ordi-
narily cannot mandate that police leadership be forced to leave because 
the department has had a pattern of unconstitutional practices.99 The sit-
uation in Warren was fortunate in that the uncooperative police chief had 
served in the department for decades and was ready to retire as the Set-
tlement Agreement was about to be implemented.100 Yet, because of nat-
ural turnover, particularly in larger cities where police chiefs are not 
likely to stay more than a couple years,101 there will likely be fairly fre-
quent opportunities to fill leadership positions with officers who em-
brace reforms even in departments without such extraordinarily well-
timed rehiring needs as the WPD. If the DOJ and the local government 
focus their resources to reform hiring practices and attract new officers 
who want to institute reforms and practice constitutional policing, they 
can help provide positive models in both the police leadership and in the 
                                                   
96. Telephone Interview with Tim Mygatt, supra note 50. 
97. POLICE PSYCHOLOGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 240 (Martin I. Kirk & Ellen M. Scrivner eds., 1995). 
The successful New York Police Department Recruit Training Program on gay and lesbian issues 
uses hypothetical models to train officers. 
98. See POLICE SELECTION AND TRAINING 154 (J.C. Yuille ed., 1986). 
99. Telephone Interview with Steve Dettelbach, supra note 77. 
100 Ed Runyan, Mandopoulos Retiring as Warren Police Chief, VINDICATOR (Apr. 10, 2009, 12:07 
AM), http://www.vindy.com/news/2009/apr/10/mandopoulos-retiring-as-warren-police-chief/ (stat-
ing that Mandopoulos had been with the department for 36 years). 
101. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Smith, supra note 20. 
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lower levels. 
 
One interesting way to incorporate modeling and also create positive 
incentives for officers to successfully avoid uses of force when possible 
is to publicize incidents when officers behaved well. The Portland Police 
Department recently made use of this technique. There, the DOJ was in-
volved to help the Portland Police Department with crisis intervention 
process.102 During the DOJ involvement, the Portland Police Depart-
ment’s Chief intentionally sought press coverage when an officer re-
solved an issue without using force.103 This created a series of stories in 
local papers recounting how officers behaved well.104 This method of 
publicizing serves the dual purpose of improving community relations 
and (just as the use of hypothetical scenarios in training) providing a 
very efficient use of modeling.105 Furthermore, this method provides an 
opoportunity for several other officers to learn—and hopefully seek to 
replicate—from another officer’s good conduct.106 For Portland, this 
method seems to work. While the total number of use of force incidents 
does vary from quarter to quarter, there is a general trend in reduction, as 
there were 197 total force incidents in 2013,107 whereas the number of 
cases involving force dropped to 150 in 2017.108 
B. Benefits to Ethical Modeling 
There are many beneficial aspects to this ethical modeling approach 
to police reforms. First, it can be used regardless of the size of the de-
partment. Most of the methods detailed above were used in Warren, a 
police department of only approximately 60 officers.109 A department 
does not need the immense manpower and resources of the New York 
Police Department or the Chicago Police Department to draw attention 
                                                   
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. This also demonstrates the interconnectedness of the various methods of using modeling. This 
kind of publicizing came as a result of the Portland Police Chief’s own initiative. Without positive 
role models in police leadership, other uses of modeling to encourage reforms are not likely to oc-
cur. See Telephone Interview with Jonathan Smith, supra note 20 (“You have to have a very good 
chief who did it on their own.”). 
106. The Seattle Police Department also implements a similar program. Telephone Interview with 
Tim Mygatt, supra note 50. 
107. JAMES H. DAKIN, PPB FORCE DATA SUMMARY REPORT (2013), https://www.portlandoregon.g
ov/police/article/482934. 
108. MICHAEL KRANTZ ET AL., PPB FORCE ANALYSIS SUMMARY (2017), https://www.portlandoreg
on.gov/police/article/639916. 
109. Telephone Interview with Eric Merkel, supra note 3. 
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to positive models of policing. Second, exploiting positive role models 
within the department is cost effective. When compared to the cost of 
hiring outside monitors, which can be quite expensive,110 mentorship, 
hypothetical scenarios, model policies, emphasizing rehiring, and draw-
ing attention to good behavior are relatively inexpensive ways to en-
courage constitutional policing even in departments with very limited 
resources. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, modeling is an effective edu-
cational tool that helps to improve the morale of the police department. 
Various educational studies have found that modeling appropriate be-
havior produces positive educational results.111 The encouraging nature 
of positive modeling also helps to improve officer morale. Discipline is 
certainly necessary to address problems in policing; police departments 
do need to create a set of incentives that discourages poor behavior and 
encourages good behavior, and discipline accomplishes half of that pur-
pose. However, if departments overemphasize discipline at the expense 
of providing positive models, they can discourage officers and cause 
them to be less enthusiastic about the need to ensure constitutional prac-
tices.112 
 
Some may feel that viewing the problem of police reform as an ethi-
cal issue rather than a technocratic issue is akin to academic hand-
waving that does not actually provide any substantive insight into the is-
sue of constitutional policing. After all, viewing the problem as one 
which creates the correct set of incentives allows plenty of room to insti-
tute not only negative incentives but positive incentives as well; police 
departments can still focus on rewarding community-oriented policing 
without bringing in the seemingly unrelated field of ethics. However, 
viewing the problem of police reform as an ethical issue illuminates the 
multi-layered nature of policing problems, which come, not just from 
bureaucratic failures, but also from failures to teach ethical behavior. 
                                                   
110. Telephone Interview with Traci Sabau, supra note 7. 
111. See Cyndy Scheibe, Piaget and Power Rangers: What Can Theories of Developmental Psy-
chology Tell Us about Children and Media, in QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUTH AND THE MEDIA 61, 63 
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partment a different place, and the positive rewards, I’m not sure people have kind of figured out the 
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Additionally, viewing the problem as at least in part ethical allows those 
who pursue police reform to draw ideas from the expansive field of ethi-
cal scholarship rather than being limited to the rather recent scholarship 
regarding bureaucratic incentives. 
 
Further, the role model component of Aristotelian virtue ethics es-
sentially makes an educational claim that is not encompassed by simply 
setting up positive incentives in addition to negative incentives. The role 
model format goes beyond providing rewards to officers regarding what 
to do; it also takes account of the fact that learning, especially learning 
that is more than simply recalling a fact but instead must manifest itself 
through conduct in high-pressure situations, can at sometimes be better 
facilitated by imitation rather than by particularized verbal instruc-
tions.113 
 
Some might also argue that in fact the problem is generally not an 
ethical problem but one of ignorance; perhaps in general police officers 
police unconstitutionally not out of malice but because they are not 
aware of the proper standards.114 This point overgeneralizes and once 
again neglects to take in to consideration all forms of police misconduct. 
While many instances of unconstitutional policing might result from ig-
norance of the law (i.e. those involving the proper standard for conduct-
ing certain searches), some instances (particularly use-of-force issues) 
do seem to carry a substantial moral component. Additionally, role mod-
els likely do provide an effective educational tool even in those instances 
                                                   
113. See, e.g., S. A. Al-Abood et al., Specificity of Task Constraints and Effects of Visual Demon-
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in which police misconduct may not seem to primarily result from moral 
failing. While the empirical data regarding the effectiveness of using 
role models compared to incident reporting is not available, there is a 
compelling argument that the use of positive models was one of the pri-
mary reasons why the reforms following the Settlement Agreement in 
Warren were so successful. 
III. Conclusion 
When one turns on the news only to hear another story of horribly 
egregious acts committed by the police, it is clear that the question of 
how to reform police conduct is largely an ethical question: how do we 
teach police officers to behave better? Thus, it is no surprise that ethical 
theories can offer some insight as to how to go about police reform. Ac-
cording to Aristotle’s philosophy of Virtue Ethics, we can facilitate ethi-
cal behavior in others by providing positive role models. This idea can 
be translated into the context of policing in several different ways, some 
of which are quite simple to implement and rather widespread now (such 
as the use of model policies and the incorporation of hypothetical sce-
narios into officer training), while others are a bit more complex and less 
universal (such as the emphasis on rehiring and publicizing stories in 
which officers successfully dealt with a situation without having to re-
sort to force). Because creating situations in which officers in need of 
training can learn from role models requires no minimum amount of 
monetary resources or manpower, police departments of any size can 
make use of Aristotle’s modeling. 
 
While it is of course necessary to provide accountability for police 
officers, it is also essential to frame reforms not only in the negative. Ra-
ther than exclusively focusing on what conduct is not permitted, we 
should also emphasize positive statements about what conduct is en-
couraged and provide models to demonstrate desired behavior. There is 
no doubt that creating accountability and enforcing discipline helps to 
influence officer behavior; but, if police departments and the DOJ do not 
take advantage of providing positive examples for officers to emulate, 
they are using only half of the methods available to them to create mean-
ingful reforms. 
